巴菲特写给股东的信（2003年）中英对照

Note: The following table appears in the printed Annual Report on the
facing page of the Chairman's Letter and is referred to in that letter.

附注：下表系董事长致股东信的参考资料，并载于年度报告的封面。

　


Berkshire's Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500

Berkshire vs S&P 500指数的比较表


Annual Percentage Change
----------------------

in Per-Share in S&P 500

Book Value of with Dividends Relative

Berkshire Included Results

Year (1) (2) (1)-(2)

1965 .................................................. 23.8 10.0 13.8

1966 .................................................. 20.3 (11.7) 32.0

1967 .................................................. 11.0 30.9 (19.9)

1968 .................................................. 19.0 11.0 8.0

1969 .................................................. 16.2 (8.4) 24.6

1970 .................................................. 12.0 3.9 8.1

1971 .................................................. 16.4 14.6 1.8

1972 .................................................. 21.7 18.9 2.8

1973 .................................................. 4.7 (14.8) 19.5

1974 .................................................. 5.5 (26.4) 31.9

1975 .................................................. 21.9 37.2 (15.3)

1976 .................................................. 59.3 23.6 35.7

1977 .................................................. 31.9 (7.4) 39.3

1978 .................................................. 24.0 6.4 17.6

1979 .................................................. 35.7 18.2 17.5

1980 .................................................. 19.3 32.3 (13.0)

1981 .................................................. 31.4 (5.0) 36.4

1982 .................................................. 40.0 21.4 18.6

1983 .................................................. 32.3 22.4 9.9

1984 .................................................. 13.6 6.1 7.5

1985 .................................................. 48.2 31.6 16.6

1986 .................................................. 26.1 18.6 7.5

1987 .................................................. 19.5 5.1 14.4

1988 .................................................. 20.1 16.6 3.5

1989 .................................................. 44.4 31.7 12.7

1990 .................................................. 7.4 (3.1) 10.5

1991 .................................................. 39.6 30.5 9.1

1992 .................................................. 20.3 7.6 12.7

1993 .................................................. 14.3 10.1 4.2

1994 .................................................. 13.9 1.3 12.6

1995 .................................................. 43.1 37.6 5.5

1996 .................................................. 31.8 23.0 8.8

1997 .................................................. 34.1 33.4 .7

1998 .................................................. 48.3 28.6 19.7

1999 .................................................. .5 21.0 (20.5)

2000 .................................................. 6.5 (9.1) 15.6

2001 .................................................. (6.2) (11.9) 5.7

2002 .................................................. 10.0 (22.1) 32.1

Average Annual Gain  1965-2002 22.2 10.0 12.2

Overall Gain  1964-2002 214,433 3,663

--------------------------------------------------

Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended
9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.

数据以历年制为准，除了1965年及1966年系至9/30;1967年则为至12/31的15个月。

Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity
securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was
previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire's results through 1978 have been
restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated
using the numbers originally reported.

从1979年开始，会计原则规定保险公司持有的股权投资必须采用市价法取代原先的成本与市价
孰低法，在本表中，1978年以前的数据已依照该原则重新调整，除此之外，其它的数字皆依照
原则的结果未作更动。

The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax where as the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a
corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the
appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index
showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P in years when the index
showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate
lag to be substantial.

S&P 500指数系以税前为准，而Berkshire的数字则属于税后，如果Berkshire直接投资S&P 500
并依此课征相关税负，则当S&P 500的报酬为正时，Berkshire的表现将不如S&P 500，相反地
若S&P 500的报酬为负时，Berkshire的表现将优于S&P 500，就长期而言，Berkshire额外负
担的税负成本将使得中间的差异日益扩大。



BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司


To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致Berkshire公司全体股东:


Our gain in net worth during 2002 was $6.1 billion, which increased the
per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 10.0%. Over
the last 38 years (that is, since present management took over) per-share
book value has grown from $19 to $41,727, a rate of 22.2% compounded
annually.*

本公司2002年的净值增加了61亿美元，每股A股或B股的账面净值增加了
10.0%，累计过去38年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每股净值由当
初的19元成长到现在的41,727美元，年复合成长率约为22.2%*。

--------------------------------

*All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire's A shares, the successor to the only
stock that the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic
interest equal to 1/30th that of the A.

*1在年报中所谓的每股数字系以A级普通股约当数为基础，这是本公司在1996年以前流通在
外唯一的一种股份，B级普通股则拥有A级普通股三十分之一的权利。


In all respects 2002 was a banner year. I’ll provide details later, but here’s a
summary:
从任何角度来看，2002年无异是丰收的一年，后面我会再详加说明，以下是几点
总结：
‧Our various non-insurance operations performed exceptionally well,
despite a sluggish economy. A decade ago Berkshire’s annual pre-tax
earnings from our non-insurance businesses was $272 million. Now, from
our ever-expanding collection of manufacturing, retailing, service and
finance businesses, we earn that sum monthly.
‧尽管外界景气低迷，但Berkshire旗下所有非保险事业的表现都异常优异，十年
前，我们非保险事业的税前盈余为2.72亿美元，但时至今日，在持续大举扩张零售、
制造、服务以及金融事业版图之后，这数字约当我们一个月的获利。

‧Our insurance group increased its float to $41.2 billion, a hefty gain of
$5.7 billion. Better yet, the use of these funds in 2002 cost us only 1%.
Getting back to low-cost float feels good, particularly after our poor
results during the three previous years. Berkshire’s reinsurance division
and GEICO shot the lights out in 2002, and underwriting discipline was
restored at General Re.
‧2002年我们旗下保险事业的浮存金大幅增加了57亿美元，累积达到412亿美
元，更棒的是，运用这些资金的成本仅为1%，能够回到以往低成本浮存金的感觉真
好，特别是经历过惨淡的前三年，Berkshire的再保险部门以及GEICO车险在2002
年都大放异彩，而General RE的承保纪律也已恢复。
‧Berkshire acquired some important new businesses – with economic
characteristics ranging from good to great, run by managers ranging from
great to great. Those attributes are two legs of our “entrance” strategy,
the third being a sensible purchase price. Unlike LBO operators and private
equity firms, we have no “exit” strategy – we buy to keep. That’s one reason
why Berkshire is usually the first – and sometimes the only – choice for
sellers and their managers.

‧Berkshire购并了几项重要的新事业，其产业竞争力在各自的业界均堪称数一数
二，并由优秀的经理人所管理，这些特点是我们"进入"策略决定关键的两只脚，至
于合理的价格则是第三只脚，不过不同于一般融资购并者LBO及私人投资银行，我
们并没有所谓的"退出"策略，在买进以后，我们就把它们好好地放着，这也是为何
Berkshire往往成为许多卖方以及其经理人，心目中的首选，有时甚至是唯一的选
择。

‧Our marketable securities outperformed most indices. For Lou Simpson,
who manages equities at GEICO, this was old stuff. But, for me, it was a
welcome change from the last few years, during which my investment
record was dismal.
‧我们的股票投资组合表现超越市场上大多数的指数，对于负责管理GEICO保险资
金的Lou Simpson来说，这是司空见惯的事，但就我个人而言，却是在经历过好几
个悲惨的年头后，终于获得翻身。

The confluence of these favorable factors in 2002 caused our book-value
gain to outstrip the performance of the S&P 500 by 32.1 percentage points.
This result is aberrational: Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s vice chairman and
my partner, and I hope to achieve – at most – an average annual advantage
f a few points. In the future, there will be years in which the S&P soundly
trounces us. That will in fact almost certainly happen during a strong bull
market, because the portion of our assets committed to common stocks
has significantly declined. This change, of course, helps our relative
performance in down markets such as we had in 2002.

综合以上这些有利的因素，造就我们的账面净值大幅超越S&P 500指数达到32.1个
百分点，这样的成绩有点反常，Berkshire的副董事长兼主要合伙人-查理曼格跟我
本人最希望的是Berkshire每年都能稳定的超越指数几个百分点就好，我想在以后
的某些年度，极有可能会看到S&P指数大幅超越我们的表现，尤其是当股市大幅上
涨的年头，主要的原因在于目前我们在股市投资占总资产的比例已大幅下降，当然
也由于是这样的转变，让我们在2002年股市大幅回档之际，仍能维持不错的绩效。
I have another caveat to mention about last year’s results. If you’ve been a
reader of financial reports in recent years, you’ve seen a flood of “pro-
forma” earnings statements – tabulations in which managers invariably
show “earnings” far in excess of those allowed by their auditors. In these
presentations, the CEO tells his owners “don’t count this, don’t count that –
just count what makes earnings fat.” Often, a forget-all-this-bad-stuff
message is delivered year after year without management so much as
blushing.
关于去年的结果，我还有一点要补充，如果你经常阅读最近几年上市公司的财务报
表，你会发现满是所谓"拟制性盈余"这类的报表-这种报表所显示的盈余数字往往都
远高于经过会计师签证的查核数，而公司高阶经理人会告诉股东们，"不要理这个，
不要管那个，只要算那些会让盈余数字好看一点的就好了"，而管理当局对于这类"
过去种种，譬如昨日死"的现象年复一年地出现，早就习以为常，一点都不会感到脸
红。
We’ve yet to see a pro-forma presentation disclosing that audited earnings
were somewhat high. So let’s make a little history: Last year, on a pro-
forma basis, Berkshire had lower earnings than those we actually reported.

我们还没有看过有那家公司的拟制报表，其盈余是低于会计师查核数字的，现在就
让我们来编一个故事，故事的大纲是：去年就拟制基础而言，Berkshire的盈余数
字远低于会计师的查核数字。
That is true because two favorable factors aided our reported figures. First,
in 2002 there was no megacatastrophe, which means that Berkshire (and
other insurers as well) earned more from insurance than if losses had been
normal. In years when the reverse is true – because of a blockbuster
hurricane, earthquake or man-made disaster – many insurers like to
report that they would have earned X “except for” the unusual event. The
implication is that since such megacats are infrequent, they shouldn’t be
counted when “true” earnings are calculated. That is deceptive nonsense.
“Except for” losses will forever be part of the insurance business, and they
will forever be paid with shareholders’ money.

我之所以会如此说，也并非全然凭空捏造，去年有两项有利的因素，让我们的财报
数字特别好看，第一，由于2002年没有发生什么重大的灾难，所以Berkshire(也包
括其它所有保险业者)赚取的盈余比一般正常的年度要多得多，反之亦然。然而奇怪
的是要是遇到飓风、地震与其它人为灾害频传的歹年冬时，许多保险同业往往会声
明"要是"没有发生XX灾难，本公司的盈余应可达到预计目标，意思是说，由于这类
灾难的发生相当特殊，所以不应该列入"正常"的盈余科目计算，这根本就是一派胡
言，要知道"特殊灾难"损失本来就是保险业司空见惯的事，而且绝对必须要由公司
背后的股东来买单。
Nonetheless, for the purposes of this exercise, we’ll take a page from the
industry’s book. For last year, when we didn’t have any truly major
disasters, a downward adjustment is appropriate if you wish to “normalize”
our underwriting result.

不论如何，我们还是继续完成这次的练习，由于去年我们没有遇到什么重大的灾难，
所以实有必要将账面盈余向下调整，以算出正常合理的承保绩效。
Secondly, the bond market in 2002 favored certain strategies we employed
in our finance and financial products business. Gains from those strategies
will certainly diminish within a year or two – and may well disappear.

其次，2002年的债券市场特别有利于我们金融产品部门的策略运作，这类的利得
在未来一两年内很可能会逐渐缩减，甚至完全消失。
Soooo . . . “except for” a couple of favorable breaks, our pre-tax earnings
last year would have been about $500 million less than we actually
reported. We’re happy, nevertheless, to bank the excess. As Jack Benny
once said upon receiving an award: “I don’t deserve this honor – but, then,
I have arthritis, and I don’t deserve that either.”

所以呢. . . 在"扣除"这几项有利的短暂因素后，我们去年实际的税前获利将比账面
减少约5亿美元，当然没有人会嫌盈余太多，就像是Jack Benny在得奖后所发表的
感言：「我实在是不配得到这个奖项，但这就像是我不应该得到关节炎一样」。


* * * * * * * * * * * *

We continue to be blessed with an extraordinary group of managers, many
of whom haven’t the slightest financial need to work. They stick around,
though: In 38 years, we’ve never had a single CEO of a subsidiary elect to
leave Berkshire to work elsewhere. Counting Charlie, we now have six
managers over 75, and I hope that in four years that number increases by
at least two (Bob Shaw and I are both 72). Our rationale: “It’s hard to teach
a new dog old tricks.” Berkshire’s operating CEOs are masters of their
crafts and run their businesses as if they were their own. My job is to stay
out of their way and allocate whatever excess capital their businesses
generate. It’s easy work.

Berkshire旗下一直有一大群杰出的经理人为我们打拼着，且其中绝大部分都已经
可以不必再为这份薪水工作，但他们依然坚守岗位，38年来还没有任何一位经理人
离开Berkshire跳槽到他处上班，包含查理在内，目前我们共有6位经理人的年龄超
过75岁，预期4年后还会再增加2名(那就是Bob Shaw跟我本人，我们现年都是72
岁)，我们的观念是，「实在是很难教新狗老把戏!」Berkshire的所有经理人都是各
自行业的佼佼者，并把公司当作是自己的事业一样在经营，至于我的任务其实相当
简单，那就是站在旁边默默鼓励，尽量不要碍着他们，并好好地运用他们所赚来的
大笔资金。

My managerial model is Eddie Bennett, who was a batboy. In 1919, at age
19, Eddie began his work with the Chicago White Sox, who that year went
to the World Series. The next year, Eddie switched to the Brooklyn Dodgers,
and they, too, won their league title. Our hero, however, smelled trouble.
Changing boroughs, he joined the Yankees in 1921, and they promptly
won their first pennant in history.

提到管理模式，我个人的偶像是一个叫做Eddie Bennett的球僮，1919年，年仅19
岁的Eddie开始他在芝加哥白袜队的职业生涯，当年度白袜队立刻就打进世界大
赛，来年Eddie跳槽到布鲁克林道奇队，果不其然，又让道奇队赢得世界大赛，之
后不久，这位传奇性的人物发现苗头不对，接着转换跑道到纽约洋基队，此举更使
得洋基队在1921年赢得队史上的第一座世界大赛冠军。
Now Eddie settled in, shrewdly seeing what was coming. In the next seven
years, the Yankees won five American League titles. What does this have to
do with management? It’s simple – to be a winner, work with winners. In
1927, for example, Eddie received $700 for the 1/8th World Series share
voted him by the legendary Yankee team of Ruth and Gehrig. This sum,
which Eddie earned by working only four days (because New York swept
the Series) was roughly equal to the full-year pay then earned by batboys
who worked with ordinary associates. Eddie understood that how he
lugged bats was unimportant; what counted instead was hooking up with
the cream of those on the playing field. I’ve learned from Eddie. At
Berkshire, I regularly hand bats to many of the heaviest hitters in American
business.

自此Eddie彷佛预知接下来会发生什么事，决定安顿下来，果不其然，洋基队在往
后的七年间，五度赢得美联的冠军，或许有人会问，这跟管理模式有什么相干?? 很
简单-那就是想要成为一个赢家，就是与其它赢家一起共事，举例来说，1927年，
Eddie因为洋基赢得世界大赛(当年棒球界传奇人物贝比鲁斯也在阵中)而分到700美
元的奖金，这笔钱大约相当于其它球僮一整年的收入，结果Eddie总共只工作4天就拿到
手(因为当年度洋基队四连胜横扫对手)，Eddie很清楚地知道他如何拎球棒并不重
要，重要的是他能为球场上最当红的明星拎球棒才是关键，我从Eddie身上学到很
多，所以在Berkshire，我就经常为美国商业大联盟的超级强打者拎球棒。


Acquisitions

购并活动
We added some sluggers to our lineup last year. Two acquisitions pending
at yearend 2001 were completed: Albecca (which operates under the name
Larson-Juhl), the U.S. leader in custom-made picture frames; and Fruit of
the Loom, the producer of about 33.3% of the men’s and boy’s underwear
sold in the U.S. and of other apparel as well. Both companies came with
outstanding CEOs: Steve McKenzie at Albecca and John Holland at Fruit.
John, who had retired from Fruit in 1996, rejoined it three years ago and
rescued the company from the disastrous path it had gone down after he’d
left. He’s now 70, and I am trying to convince him to make his next
retirement coincident with mine (presently scheduled for five years after
my death – a date subject, however, to extension).

去年我们的打击阵容又增添了好几位强打者，两件从2001年就开始谈的案子在去
年结案，全美相框订做业的领导厂商Albecca(以Larson-Jhul品牌经营)以及Fruit
of the Loom纺织公司，全美约有1/3的男士及儿童内衣系由该公司制造，当然该
公司还有销售其它服装，两家公司都由相当优秀的经理人领军，Albecca有Steve
MaKenzie，而Fruit of the Loom则有John Holland，后者在1996年自该公司退
休，三年前又回锅挽救该公司免于毁灭的命运，他今年70岁，现在我正努力说服他
跟我同进退(目前我个人预定在死后5年再办理退休，并且有可能会视状况予以延
长)。
We initiated and completed two other acquisitions last year that were
somewhat below our normal size threshold. In aggregate, however, these
businesses earn more than $60 million pre-tax annually. Both operate in
industries characterized by tough economics, but both also have important
competitive strengths that enable them to earn decent returns on capital.

此外，去年我们另外又完成的其它两件规模较小的购并案，不过两家公司加起来的
年度税前获利超过6,000万美元，虽然两者所处的产业竞争都相当激烈，但却同样
拥有相当的竞争优势，使得我们的投资依然能够维持不错的报酬率。
The newcomers are:
这两位新成员分别是

(a) CTB, a worldwide leader in equipment for the poultry, hog, egg
production and grain industries; and

(a)CTB-全世界鸡、猪等农畜养殖设备的领导厂商
(b) Garan, a manufacturer of children’s apparel, whose largest and best-
known line is GaranimalsR.
(b)Garan-童装生产厂商，以Garanimals等著名品牌对外营销。
These two companies came with the managers responsible for their
impressive records: Vic Mancinelli at CTB and Seymour Lichtenstein at
Garan. The largest acquisition we initiated in 2002 was The Pampered
Chef, a company with a fascinating history dating back to 1980. Doris
Christopher was then a 34-year-old suburban Chicago home economics
teacher with a husband, two little girls, and absolutely no business
background. Wanting, however, to supplement her family’s modest
income, she turned to thinking about what she knew best – food
preparation. Why not, she wondered, make a business out of marketing
kitchenware, focusing on the items she herself had found most useful?
两家公司的经理人过去都拥有令人印象深刻的成绩，CTB的Vic Mancinelli以及
Garan的Seymour Lichtenstein，至于在2002年开始进行的购并案中，规模最大
的就属The Pampered Chef(TPC)-这也是一家拥有辉煌历史的传奇公司，时间回
溯到1980年，当时34岁的Doris Christopher还是一位芝加哥郊区家庭经济学的教
师，与先生育有2个小女儿的她，完全就没有任何商业经验，为了要补贴家庭微薄
的收入，她想到运用本身最拿手的绝活-准备食物，她在想想是不是可以利用家里
的餐具来做点生意，这是她自己认为身边最派得上用场的东西。

To get started, Doris borrowed $3,000 against her life insurance policy – all
the money ever injected into the company – and went to the Merchandise
Mart on a buying expedition. There, she picked up a dozen each of this and
that, and then went home to set up operations in her basement.
为了要创业，Doris利用寿险保单质借了3,000美元，这也是她仅有的一次资金投
入，然后到大卖场进行一趟采购之旅，买了一大堆烹饪餐具，然后回到家里的地下
室展开事业。
Her plan was to conduct in-home presentations to small groups of women,
gathered at the homes of their friends. While driving to her first
presentation, though, Doris almost talked herself into returning home,
convinced she was doomed to fail.
她的计划是集合一群女性友人到其朋友家里进行展示，记得在第一次出发公开展示
的路上，Doris几乎要说服自己放弃打道回府。
But the women she faced that evening loved her and her products,
purchased $175 of goods, and TPC was underway. Working with her
husband, Jay, Doris did $50,000 of business in the first year. Today – only
22 years later – TPC does more than $700 million of business annually,
working through 67,000 kitchen consultants. I’ve been to a TPC party,
and it’s easy to see why the business is a success. The company’s
products, in large part proprietary, are well-styled and highly useful, and
the consultants are knowledgeable and enthusiastic. Everyone has a good
time. Hurry to pamperedchef.com on the Internet to find where to attend a
party near you.
所幸当晚她所遇到的女性朋友们相当喜爱她及她的产品，总共买了175美元的东
西，TPC于焉诞生，在她的先生Jay的帮忙之下，Doris头一年总共做了50,000美元
的生意，22年后的今天，TPC的年营业额高达7亿美元，共有67,000名餐饮顾问，
我自己也曾经参加过TPC的宴会，很轻易地就能发现这个行业成功的原因，公司的
产品大部分都是独家专用、造型设计优美且深具实用性，而餐饮顾问的经验丰富且
非常热心，这使得与会的每一位客人都尽兴而归，赶快上pamperedchef.com网站
看看如何才能就近参加她们所举办的派对。
Two years ago, Doris brought in Sheila O’Connell Cooper, now CEO, to
share the management load, and in August they met with me in Omaha. It
took me about ten seconds to decide that these were two managers with
whom I wished to partner, and we promptly made a deal. Berkshire
shareholders couldn’t be luckier than to be associated with Doris and
Sheila.

两年前，Doris找到现任总裁-Sheila O'Connell Cooper加入，以分担管理重责，
两人在八月联袂来到奥玛哈与我会面，我前后只花了10秒钟的时间就确定我想要这
两个人加入我们的团队，当下双方就签订合约，能够与Doris与Sheila在一起共事，
Berkshire的股东实在是再幸运也不过了。


* * * * * * * * * * * *

Berkshire also made some important acquisitions last year through
MidAmerican Energy Holdings (MEHC), a company in which our equity
interest is 80.2%. Because the Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA)
limits us to 9.9% voting control, however, we are unable to fully consolidate
MEHC’s financial statements.

去年透过持股80.2%的中美能源MEHC，Berkshire也进行了几项重要的购并案，由
于公用事业控股公司法(PUHCA)限制我们只能拥有该公司9.9%的投票权，所以我们
无法将MEHC的财务数字，完全并到母公司的财务报表之中。
Despite the voting-control limitation – and the somewhat strange capital
structure at MEHC it has engendered – the company is a key part of
Berkshire. Already it has $18 billion of assets and delivers our largest
stream of non-insurance earnings. It could well grow to be huge. Last
year MEHC acquired two important gas pipelines. The first, Kern River,
extends from Southwest Wyoming to Southern California. This line moves
about 900 million cubic feet of gas a day and is undergoing a $1.2 billion
expansion that will double throughput by this fall. At that point, the line
will carry enough gas to generate electricity for ten million homes. The
second acquisition, Northern Natural Gas, is a 16,600 mile line extending
from the Southwest to a wide range of Midwestern locations. This purchase
completes a corporate odyssey of particular interest to Omahans.

尽管受限于投票控制权的限制，使得MEHC现在的资本结构有点奇怪，但该公司仍
然Berkshire非常重要的一部份，目前它的资产总额达到180亿美元，并成为
Berkshire非保险事业盈余的主要来源，展望未来，其成长依然可期，去年MEHC买
下了两条重要的天然气管线，第一条是从怀俄明州到南加州，名为肯特河的管线，
每天运送9亿立方英呎的天然气，且目前我们又另外投资12亿美元进行扩充，预计
在今年秋天完工后，运输能量可增加一倍，届时将可满足1,000万个家庭用户所需，
第二条路线则是从美国西南部一路延伸到中西部，全长16,600英哩，名为「北方天
然」的管线，这项购并案更是引起奥玛哈地区居民的注意，传为企业美谈。

From its beginnings in the 1930s, Northern Natural was one of Omaha’s
premier businesses, run by CEOs who regularly distinguished themselves
as community leaders. Then, in July, 1985, the company – which in 1980
had been renamed InterNorth – merged with Houston Natural Gas, a
business less than half its size. The companies announced that the
enlarged operation would be headquartered in Omaha, with InterNorth’s
CEO continuing in that job. Within a year, those promises were broken. By
then, the former CEO of Houston Natural had taken over the top job at
InterNorth, the company had been renamed, and the headquarters had
been moved to Houston. These switches were orchestrated by the new
CEO – Ken Lay – and the name he chose was Enron.

自从1930年代初期，「北方天然」一直是奥玛哈地区著名的企业之一，由地方上流
社会的领导人士所经营，不过该公司在1985年(1980年改名为InterNorth)被规模
不到它一半的休斯敦天然气所购并，该公司当时曾宣布将让总部继续设在奥玛哈，
并让原CEO继续留任，只是不满一年，这些承诺就被打破，休斯敦天然气的原任总
裁接掌总裁职位，总部也搬到休斯敦，更有甚者，连公司名称都被后来新继任的总
裁-Ken Lay改名为. . . .「安隆」!!。

Fast forward 15 years to late 2001. Enron ran into the troubles we’ve heard
so much about and borrowed money from Dynegy, putting up the Northern
Natural pipeline operation as collateral. The two companies quickly had a
falling out, and the pipeline’s ownership moved to Dynegy. That company,
in turn, soon encountered severe financial problems of its own. MEHC
received a call on Friday, July 26, from Dynegy, which was looking for a
quick and certain cash sale of the pipeline. Dynegy phoned the right party:
On July 29, we signed a contract, and shortly thereafter Northern Natural
returned home. When 2001 began, Charlie and I had no idea that
Berkshire would be moving into the pipeline business. But upon
completion of the Kern River expansion, MEHC will transport about 8% of
all gas used in the U.S. We continue to look for large energy-related assets,
though in the electric utility field PUHCA constrains what we can do.

时光飞逝，话说到了15年之后的2001年，安隆营运发生重大困难，被迫向另一家
能源公司Dynegy借钱，并以「北方天然」这条管线作为质押担保品，结果不久之
后，这条管线的所有权就移转到Dynegy的名下，只是没想到Dynegy过不了多久也
发生严重的财务问题， MEHC在7/26星期五接到Dynegy公司打来的电话，对方希
望将这条管线立即变现以取得现金，我想他们算是找对人了，紧接着在7/29，我们
就签订了一项合约，就这样「北方天然」终于回到家乡的怀抱，早在2001年初，
查理跟我压根就没想到，我们会介入能源管线业的经营，不过在完成肯特河管线扩
充案之后，MEHC所运送的天然气，将占全美使用量的8%，而在这之后，我们仍将
继续寻求大型的能源事业投资案，虽然在能源产业，PUHCA依然对我们还有诸多限
制。


* * * * * * * * * * * *

A few years ago, and somewhat by accident, MEHC found itself in the
residential real estate brokerage business. It is no accident, however, that
we have dramatically expanded the operation. Moreover, we are likely to
keep on expanding in the future. We call this business HomeServices of
America. In the various communities it serves, though, it operates under
the names of the businesses it has acquired, such as CBS in Omaha, Edina
Realty in Minneapolis and Iowa Realty in Des Moines. In most metropolitan
areas in which we operate, we are the clear market leader.

几年前，MEHC在无意中，发现自己介入不动产中介业的经营，只是后来我们大幅
扩张这方面的业务却绝非意外，更有甚者，我们有意在未来继续拓展营运规模，我
们将之称呼为"美国人的居家服务"，虽然依照地区的不同，我们以取得当地据点时
的原名称对外经营，比如说奥玛哈的CBS、明尼拿波里市的Edina不动产或Des
Moines的艾荷华不动产等，在多数我们有营运的大都会中，我们都是市场的领导
者。
HomeServices is now the second largest residential brokerage business in
the country. On one side or the other (or both), we participated in $37
billion of transactions last year, up 100% from 2001. Most of our growth
came from three acquisitions we made during 2002, the largest of which
was Prudential California Realty. Last year, this company, the leading
realtor in a territory consisting of Los Angeles, Orange and San Diego
Counties, participated in $16 billion of closings. In a very short period,
Ron Peltier, the company’s CEO, has increased HomeServices’ revenues –
and profits – dramatically. Though this business will always be cyclical, it’s
one we like and in which we continue to have an appetite for sensible
acquisitions.

居家服务现在是全美第二大的住宅不动产中介商，我们去年参与了总值370亿美元
的不动产交易案，(包含单边或双边)，较2001年增加了一倍，大部分的成长动力来
自于我们在2002年进行的三项购并案，其中最大的一件是保德信加州不动产，该
公司是洛杉矶、橘郡及圣地亚哥等地最大的业者，去年促成的不动产成交总额高达
160亿美元，该公司的CEO-Ron Peltier在相当短的时间之内，就让居家服务的营
收及获利大幅成长，虽然这个行业的产业循环波动性相当的大，但仍然不失为我们
想要继续进行购并扩张的行业。


* * * * * * * * * * * *

Dave Sokol, MEHC’s CEO, and Greg Abel, his key associate, are huge assets
for Berkshire. They are dealmakers, and they are managers. Berkshire
stands ready to inject massive amounts of money into MEHC – and it will be
fun to watch how far Dave and Greg can take the business.

Dave Sokol-MEHC的CEO及其主要伙伴Greg Abel，现在已成为Berkshire珍贵的
资产，他们是梦想创造者，更是优秀的经理人，Berkshire已准备好要挹注大量的
资金到MEHC，相当期待Dave与Greg会如何运用这些资金开疆辟土。


The Economics of Property/Casualty Insurance

产物意外险的经营

Our core business — though we have others of great importance — is
insurance. To understand Berkshire, therefore, it is necessary that you
understand how to evaluate an insurance company. The key determinants
are: (1) the amount of float that the business generates; (2) its cost; and (3)
most critical of all, the long-term outlook for both of these factors.

我们最主要的本业就是保险，当然其它事业也相当重要，想要了解Berkshire，你
就必须知道如何去评估一家保险公司，其中主要的关键因素有(1)这家公司所能产生
的浮存金数量(2)以及它的成本(3)最重要的是这些因素长期的展望。

To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance
operation, float arises because premiums are received before losses are
paid, an interval that sometimes extends over many years. During that
time, the insurer invests the money. This pleasant activity typically carries
with it a downside: The premiums that an insurer takes in usually do not
cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay. That leaves it
running an “underwriting loss,” which is the cost of float. An insurance
business has value if its cost of float over time is less than the cost the
company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business is a
lemon if its cost of float is higher than market rates for money. Moreover,
the downward trend of interest rates in recent years has transformed
underwriting losses that formerly were tolerable into burdens that move
insurance businesses deeply into the lemon category.

首先浮存金是一项我们持有但却不属于我们的资金，在保险公司的营运中，浮存
金产生的原因在于保险公司在真正支付损失理赔之前，一般会先向保户收取保
费，在这期间保险公司会将资金运用在其它投资之上，当然这样的好处也必须要
付出代价，通常保险业者收取的保费并不足以支应最后支付出去的相关损失与费
用，于是保险公司便会发生承保损失，这就是浮存金的成本，而当一家公司取得
浮存金成本，就长期而言低于从其它管道取得资金的成本时，它就有存在的价
值，否则一旦保险事业取得浮存金的成本远高于货币市场利率时，它就像是一颗
极酸的柠檬。

Historically, Berkshire has obtained its float at a very low cost. Indeed, our
cost has been less than zero in many years; that is, we’ve actually been
paid for holding other people’s money. In 2001, however, our cost was
terrible, coming in at 12.8%, about half of which was attributable to World
Trade Center losses. Back in 1983-84, we had years that were even worse.
There’s nothing automatic about cheap float.

根据过去的记录显示，Berkshire 一向能够以很低的成本取得浮存金，确实在
Berkshire经营的这些年来，有半数以上的年头，浮存金的成本甚至低于零，也就
是说这实际上等于是别人要付费请我们帮他们保管资金，然而最近这几年，我们的
成本大幅飙涨，2001年尤其恐怖，资金成本大幅飙涨至12.8%，其中半数归因于世
界贸易大楼损失，回顾过去，我们在1983到1984年间，也曾有过更悲惨的记录，
便宜的浮存金绝非凭空而降。
The table that follows shows (at intervals) the float generated by the
various segments of Berkshire’s insurance operations since we entered the
business 36 years ago upon acquiring National Indemnity Company (whose
traditional lines are included in the segment “Other Primary”). For the table
we have calculated our float — which we generate in large amounts relative
to our premium volume — by adding net loss reserves, loss adjustment
reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium
reserves, and then subtracting insurance-related receivables, prepaid
acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges applicable to
assumed reinsurance. (Got that?)

下表中所显示的数字是，Berkshire自取得国家产险公司经营权，进入保险事业
36年以来所贡献的浮存金，(其中传统业务包含在其它主险项下)，在这张计算
浮存金的表中，(相对于收到的保费收入，我们持有的浮存金部位算是相当大的)
我们将所有的损失准备、损失费用调整准备、再保预先收取的资金与未赚取保费
加总后，再扣除应付佣金、预付购并成本、预付税负以及取得再保业务的相关递
延费用，得出浮存金的数额，弄清楚了吗??

Yearend Float (in $ millions)

Other Other

Year GEICO General Re Reinsurance Primary Total

------ ------- --------- ---------- ------- ------
1967 20 20

1977 40 131 171

1987 701 807 1,508

1997 2,917 4,014 455 7,386

1998 3,125 14,909 4,305 415 22,754

1999 3,444 15,166 6,285 403 25,298

2000 3,943 15,525 7,805 598 27,871

2001 4,251 19,310 11,262 685 35,508

2002 4,678 22,207 13,396 943 41,224

Last year our cost of float was 1%. As I mentioned earlier, you should
temper your enthusiasm about this favorable result given that no
megacatastrophe occurred in 2002. We’re certain to get one of these
disasters periodically, and when we do our float-cost will spike.
去年我们的浮存金成本约为1%，不过从前我就曾说过，大家千万不要被这样的结果
冲昏了头，那完全是因为2002年没有发生什么重大的天灾人祸所致，总有一天，
我们会让碰到某些大灾难，届时我们的浮存金成本将激增。

Our 2002 results were hurt by 1) a painful charge at General Re for losses
that should have been recorded as costs in earlier years, and 2) a
“desirable” charge we incur annually for retroactive insurance (see the
next section for more about these items). These costs totaled $1.75 billion,
or about 4.6% of float. Fortunately, our overall underwriting experience
on 2002 business was excellent, which allowed us, even after the charges
noted, to approach a no-cost result.
此外2002年我们的绩效受到 1)补提通用再保先前年度未认列的损失 2)追溯再保
险业务每年固定必须提列的损失成本(在后面还会有详细的说明)，这些成本金额总
计17.5亿美元，约为浮存金的4.6%，可喜的是，除此之外，2002年我们整体的承
保经验相当不错，这使得我们即便在提列以上损失之后，仍然接近损益两平。

Absent a megacatastrophe, I expect our cost of float in 2003 to again be
very low – perhaps even less than zero. In the rundown of our insurance
operations that follows, you will see why I’m optimistic that, over time, our
underwriting results will both surpass those achieved by the industry and
deliver us investable funds at minimal cost.

除非再发生什么重大的天灾人祸，否则我预期2003年的浮存金成本将可以压得非
常低，甚至有可能在零以下，在以下保险子公司的营运概述中，各位将可以明了为
何我会那么有信心，就长期而言，我相信我们的承保绩效一定可以超越同业的平均
水平，从而让我们以相当低的成本取得投资所需的资金。

Insurance Operations

保险事业营运状况
If our insurance operations are to generate low-cost float over time, they
must: (a) underwrite with unwavering discipline; (b) reserve conservatively;
and (c) avoid an aggregation of exposures that would allow a supposedly
“impossible” incident to threaten their solvency. All of our major
insurance businesses, with one exception, have regularly met those tests.

如果我们的保险事业长期以来想要产生低成本的浮存金，必须要做到以下几点，(a)
必须有毫不妥协的承保纪律(b)稳健保守地提列准备(c)避免那些看起来"不可能发生
"意外所累积的风险部位影响到公司的偿债能力，除了一家公司以外，我们其它所有
主要的保险事业大致都能谨守这些原则。

The exception is General Re, and there was much to do at that company
last year to get it up to snuff. I’m delighted to report that under Joe
Brandon’s leadership, and with yeoman assistance by Tad Montross,
enormous progress has been made on each of the fronts described.
这个例外正是通用再保，所幸去年该公司进行了许多的改进动作，现在我很高兴地
向各位报告，那就是在Joe Brandon的领导，以及Tad Montross尽心尽力的辅佐
下，该公司在以上提到的这几点皆有重大的进展。
When I agreed in 1998 to merge Berkshire with Gen Re, I thought that
company stuck to the three rules I’ve enumerated. I had studied the
operation for decades and had observed underwriting discipline that was
consistent and reserving that was conservative. At merger time, I detected
no slippage in Gen Re’s standards.
当我在1998年同意由Berkshire购并通用再保时，我以为该公司早已谨守以上我所
揭示的三项原则，因为我已追踪该公司营运达数十年，也发现到其承保纪律相当一
致，同时损失准备提列也相当保守，可以说在购并的当头，我并未发现到通用再保
的标准有任何漏洞。
I was dead wrong. Gen Re’s culture and practices had substantially
changed and unbeknownst to management – and to me – the company was
grossly mispricing its current business. In addition, Gen Re had
accumulated an aggregation of risks that would have been fatal had, say,
terrorists detonated several largescale nuclear bombs in an attack on the
U.S. A disaster of that scope was highly improbable, of course, but it is up
to insurers to limit their risks in a manner that leaves their finances rock-
solid if the “impossible” happens. Indeed, had Gen Re remained
independent, the World Trade Center attack alone would have threatened
the company’s existence.
不过事后证明我的看法大错特错，通用再保的文化以及作风在近年来已彻底的变
质，而管理当局，包含我本人在内却不自知，这家公司的业务很明显地订价不当，
此外通用再保在更不知不觉地累积了致命的风险，例如，恐怖份子就有可能连续引
爆大规模的核子炸弹来攻击美国，虽然发生这样灾难的机率微乎其微，但保险公司
却绝对必须谨慎地将风险限制在让公司的财务稳若盘石的境地，以防万一这种不可
能的事情果真发生，事实上，我们可以说当初通用再保要是没有并进Berkshire的
话，单单世界贸易大楼攻击事件的损失就足以危及公司的经营。
When the WTC disaster occurred, it exposed weaknesses in Gen Re’s
operations that I should have detected earlier. But I was lucky: Joe and Tad
were on hand, freshly endowed with increased authority and eager to
rapidly correct the errors of the past. They knew what to do – and they did
it.
世贸大楼攻击事件的发生，严重地凸显了通用再保营运上的缺失，这是我早该注意
却偏偏没有注意到的一点，所幸我的运气还算不错，有Joe跟Tad在身边，随时准备
好被赋予重任，并充满改变过去陋规的企图心，他们很清楚该怎么做，而且也确实
做到了。
It takes time for insurance policies to run off, however, and 2002 was well
along before we managed to reduce our aggregation of nuclear, chemical
and biological risk (NCB) to a tolerable level. That problem is now behind
us.
虽然保险契约有时间递延性，不过2002年整体的结果还算令人满意，虽然我们仍
未将核子生化等事故(简称NCB)累积的风险降到可以忍受的限度之内，但目前这个
问题已成过去式。
On another front, Gen Re’s underwriting attitude has been dramatically
altered: The entire organization now understands that we wish to write
only properly-priced business, whatever the effect on volume. Joe and Tad
judge themselves only by Gen Re’s underwriting profitability. Size simply
doesn’t count.
在另外一方面，通用再保的承保心态也已做了彻底的转变，目前整个团队相当明了
我们只愿意接受价格合理业务的态度，至于金额则没有上限，Joe跟Tad只惟通用再
保的获利结果是问，至于规模问题则完全不用顾虑。
Finally, we are making every effort to get our reserving right. If we fail at
that, we can’t know our true costs. And any insurer that has no idea what
its costs are is heading for big trouble.

最后，我们正尽可能地提列适当的损失准备，如果我们做不到这一点，那么我们可
能根本就不知道我们真实的成本，任何一家不了解自家公司成本的保险业者，将来
肯定会发生大纰漏。
At yearend 2001, General Re attempted to reserve adequately for all losses
that had occurred prior to that date and were not yet paid – but we failed
badly. Therefore the company’s 2002 underwriting results were penalized
by an additional $1.31 billion that we recorded to correct the estimation
mistakes of earlier years. When I review the reserving errors that have been
uncovered at General Re, a line from a country song seems apt: “I wish I
didn’t know now what I didn’t know then.”
记得在2001年底，通用再保试图将以前年度提列已发生但未支付的损失准备补
足，但事后证明我们做的还差得很远，这使得该公司必须在2002年再补提13.1亿
美元的损失，以修正以前年度所发生的估计错误，当我在检视通用再保后来才被发
现的准备提列疏失时，我突然想到有一首乡村歌曲的歌词形容的相当贴切，「真希望
现在的我没有发现以前我不知情的那段往事」。
I can promise you that our top priority going forward is to avoid inadequate
reserving. But I can’t guarantee success. The natural tendency of most
casualty-insurance managers is to underreserve, and they must have a
particular mindset – which, it may surprise you, has nothing to do with
actuarial expertise – if they are to overcome this devastating bias.
Additionally, a reinsurer faces far more difficulties in reserving properly
than does a primary insurer. Nevertheless, at Berkshire, we have generally
been successful in our reserving, and we are determined to be at General
Re as well.
我可以向各位保证，未来我们的首要目标就是避免损失准备提列的不当，当然我无
法保证一定做得到，保险公司经理人大多倾向少提列一些准备，而想要克服这种糟
糕的偏差，他们必须将其特殊的心态做个调整，说起来或许你会讶异，这完全与精
算专业无关，同时，相对于初级保险业者，再保业者适当提列准备的难度更高，不
过即便如此，在Berkshire，我们在损失准备提列这点做得还算不错，而我们也将
努力让通用再保比照办理。
In summary, I believe General Re is now well positioned to deliver huge
amounts of no-cost float to Berkshire and that its sink-the-ship
catastrophe risk has been eliminated. The company still possesses the
important competitive strengths that I’ve outlined in the past. And it
gained another highly significant advantage last year when each of its
three largest worldwide competitors, previously rated AAA, was demoted
by at least one rating agency. Among the giants, General Re, rated AAA
across-the-board, is now in a class by itself in respect to financial
strength.
总的来说，我相信通用再保现在已准备好要为Berkshire贡献大量无成本的浮存
金，整家公司倒闭的风险可说已被排除，该公司仍然拥有过去我一再提到的竞争优
势，同时在去年它又获得另外一项重要的竞争优势，那就是其它三家原本同列三A
最高信用评等的世界级主要竞争同业，在去年至少都被调降一个评等等级，在这些
保险巨擘当中，唯有通用再保一路维持三A评等，在象征财务实力的领域中取得独
占鳌头的地位。
No attribute is more important. Recently, in contrast, one of the world’s
largest reinsurers – a company regularly recommended to primary insurers
by leading brokers – has all but ceased paying claims, including those
both valid and due. This company owes many billions of dollars to
hundreds of primary insurers who now face massive write-offs. “Cheap”
reinsurance is a fool’s bargain: When an insurer lays out money today in
exchange for a reinsurer’s promise to pay a decade or two later, it’s
dangerous – and possibly life-threatening – for the insurer to deal with any
but the strongest reinsurer around.
再没有其它特点比这个更重要了，相较之下，最近某家世界级的大型再保公司-该
公司通常名列保险经纪人推荐给客户的首选，目前已暂停支付损失理赔金，包含那
些有效且到期的部份，该公司积欠高达数十亿美元的理赔金，这迫使其数百家保险
客户必须面临大幅冲销应收款的命运，"便宜"对再保业来说，绝对是愚蠢的交易，
当保险业者今天将资金付给再保业者以换取一、二十年后的保障承诺时，唯有跟实
力最强的再保业者打交道，才有可能避免无谓且有时甚至危及企业生存的风险。
Berkshire shareholders owe Joe and Tad a huge thank you for their
accomplishments in 2002. They worked harder during the year than I
would wish for anyone – and it is paying off.
Berkshire的全体股东应该深深感谢，Joe跟Tad在2002年为我们所做的一切，他们
去年一整年尤其特别的辛苦，当然这一切的努力现在已获得回报。


* * * * * * * * * * * *

At GEICO, everything went so well in 2002 that we should pinch ourselves.
Growth was substantial, profits were outstanding, policyholder retention
was up and sales productivity jumped significantly. These trends continue
in early 2003.
在GEICO，2002年所有的事都再顺利也不过了，好到甚至让我们无法置信，成长
的幅度相当可观，获利也相当突出，保户续约率持续提升，同时业务生产力也大幅
跃升，而且这些现象在2003年依然继续维持。
Thank Tony Nicely for all of this. As anyone who knows him will attest,
Tony has been in love with GEICO for 41 years – ever since he went to work
for the company at 18 – and his results reflect this passion. He is proud of
the money we save policyholders – about $1 billion annually versus what
other insurers, on average, would have charged them. He is proud of the
service we provide these policyholders: In a key industry survey, GEICO was
recently ranked above all major competitors. He is proud of his 19,162
associates, who last year were awarded profit-sharing payments equal to
19% of their base salary because of the splendid results they achieved. And
he is proud of the growing profits he delivers to Berkshire shareholders.

感谢Tony Nicely为我们所做的一切，认识他的人都知道，他跟GEICO结缘已达41
个年头，当时他的年龄只有18岁，而他的成绩有目共睹，他一向对于能为客户节省
保费感到相当自傲，相较于其它保险业者，GEICO平均每年可为保户省下10亿美元
的保费，同时他也对GEICO提供的服务相当有信心，根据业界的一项调查，GEICO
目前名列消费者满意度第一名，同时他更对旗下19,162位同仁引以为傲，去年这些
同仁因为优异的表现，总共为自己赚取了相当于19%底薪的奖金，最后他也对持续
为Berkshire贡献稳定成长的获利感到自豪。
GEICO took in $2.9 billion in premiums when Berkshire acquired full
ownership in 1996. Last year, its volume was $6.9 billion, with plenty of
growth to come. Particularly promising is the company’s Internet
operation, whose new business grew by 75% last year. Check us out at
GEICO.com (or call 800-847-7536). In most states, shareholders get a
special 8% discount.
1996年在我们完全买下GEICO时，它的年度保费收入约为29亿美元，去年这个数
字增加到69亿美元，而后续成长依然可期，其中尤以网络营销最具潜力，去年这个
部门成长率高达75%，记得到GEICO.com看看(或电800-847-7536)，在大部分的
州，股东都可以得到8%的特别折扣。
Here’s one footnote to GEICO’s 2002 earnings that underscores the need
for insurers to do business with only the strongest of reinsurers. In
1981-1983, the managers then running GEICO decided to try their hand at
writing commercial umbrella and product liability insurance. The risks
seemed modest: the company took in only $3,051,000 from this line and
used almost all of it – $2,979,000 – to buy reinsurance in order to limit its
losses. GEICO was left with a paltry $72,000 as compensation for the minor
portion of the risk that it retained. But this small bite of the apple was more
than enough to make the experience memorable. GEICO’s losses from
this venture now total a breathtaking $94.1 million or about 130,000% of
the net premium it received. Of the total loss, uncollectable receivables
from deadbeat reinsurers account for no less than $90.3 million (including
$19 million charged in 2002). So much for “cheap” reinsurance.
关于GEICO 2002年的盈余有一件事要附带报告，这件事突显了保险公司绝对只能
与最好的再保公司往来的重要性，话说1981年到1983年间，当时负责经营GEICO
的经理人决定要在商业防护及产品责任险上试试身手，这类风险看起来似乎不大，
事实上，公司在当年也不过收取了约305万美元的保费，但却耗费了其中298万美
元投保了再保险，打算将风险限制在一定范围内，总结GEICO仅留下区区7万美元
而已，以作为承担自留风险的对价，谁知这样的安排，竟让公司留下了难以抹灭的
惨痛经验，总计GEICO后来为此承受的损失高达9,410万美元，约当所收取净保费
的1,300倍，在这笔损失中，再保公司应收赔款不算太多，只不过是9,030万美元
而已!!(其中包含2002年认列的1,900万损失)，便宜实在是没好货!


* * * * * * * * * * * *

Ajit Jain’s reinsurance division was the major reason our float cost us so
little last year. If we ever put a photo in a Berkshire annual report, it will be
of Ajit. In color!
Ajit Jain领导的再保险部门是我们去年浮存金成本之所以能够压得这么低的主要原
因，如果Berkshire的年报必须要斉d趣，可以跳过后面两
段不看)。
Ajit’s 2002 underwriting profit of $534 million came after his operation
recognized a charge of $428 million attributable to “retroactive” insurance
he has written over the years. In this line of business, we assume from
another insurer the obligation to pay up to a specified amount for losses
they have already incurred – often for events that took place decades
earlier – but that are yet to be paid (for example, because a worker hurt in
1980 will receive monthly payments for life). In these arrangements, an
insurer pays us a large upfront premium, but one that is less than the
losses we expect to pay. We willingly accept this differential because a) our
payments are capped, and b) we get to use the money until loss payments
are actually made, with these often stretching out over a decade or more.
About 80% of the $6.6 billion in asbestos and environmental loss reserves
that we carry arises from capped contracts, whose costs consequently
can’t skyrocket.
Ajit 2002年的承保利益达5.34亿美元，其中包括所承担4.28亿美元的追溯再保险
损失，经由这类的业务，我们承受其它保险业者已经发生损失但尚未履行完毕的义
务，这类损失通常早在许多年前就已经发生，但理赔金到现在却还没有付完，(举例
来说一件1980年发生的职业灾害，但现在可能还持续按月支付终生的理赔金)，在
这类协议中，由保险业者一次支付一大笔保险费给我们，但金额仍远低于我们将来
预期要付出的总数，而我们之所以愿意这样做，原因在于a)我们支付的金额仍有其
上限，b)在理赔金真正付出之前的空档，期间往往长达数十年以上，我们得以运用
这笔资金)，在我们受理的66亿美元的石绵及环境伤害损失准备中，有80%是有上
限的合约，因此其损失成本不至于无限制飙升。

When we write a retroactive policy, we immediately record both the
premium and a reserve for the expected losses. The difference between the
two is entered as an asset entitled “deferred charges –reinsurance
assumed.” This is no small item: at yearend, for all retroactive policies, it
was $3.4 billion. We then amortize this asset downward by charges to
income over the expected life of each policy. These charges – $440 million
in 2002, including charges at Gen Re – create an underwriting loss, but one
that is intentional and desirable. And even after this drag on reported
results, Ajit achieved a large underwriting gain last year.
当我们签下一张追溯再保险保单时，我们立即将保费收入入帐，并把预期会发生的
损失提列准备，至于两者的差额则以一项资产科目"递延费用-承受再保险"入帐，这
金额通常都不小，截至年底，帐列资产负债表的这个科目金额就高达34亿美元，之
后我们会按这笔资产的预计年限分年摊销，并列为损益减项，2002年的摊销金额
高达4.4亿美元(含通用再保部份)，这些承保损失是我们事先就预期到的必然科目，
但即便帐列盈余因此受到拖累，Ajit去年依然缔造了可观的承保利益。
We want to emphasize, however, that we assume risks in Ajit’s operation
that are huge – far larger than those retained by any other insurer in the
world. Therefore, a single event could cause a major swing in Ajit’s results
in any given quarter or year. That bothers us not at all: As long as we are
paid appropriately, we love taking on short-term volatility that others wish
to shed. At Berkshire, we would rather earn a lumpy 15% over time than a
smooth 12%. If you see Ajit at our annual meeting, bow deeply.
不过我们想要强调的是，我们早就预期到Ajit营运所承担的风险相当的高，甚至远
高于世界上其它任何保险业者所自留的风险，因此只要任何一季或任何一个年头有
任何单一重大灾害发生，都可能让Ajit的绩效大打折扣，不过这一点一点也不会让
我们感到困扰，只要我们收到的保费合理，我们乐于承担那些别人避之唯恐不及的
短期损益变动，在Berkshire，我们宁愿赚取变动不拘但达平均15%的投资报酬，也
不要稳定的12%报酬，各位如果在股东会上遇到Ajit，记得献上深深的一鞠躬。


* * * * * * * * * * * *

Berkshire’s smaller insurers had an outstanding year. Their aggregate float
grew by 38%, and they realized an underwriting profit of $32 million, or
4.5% of premiums. Collectively, these operations would make one of the
finest insurance companies in the country.
Berkshire其它规模较小的保险公司其表现同样突出，合计浮存金增加了38%，并贡
献了3,200万美元的承保利益，约当保费收入的4.5%，如果这些公司加起来，可以
堪称为全美最好的保险公司之一。
Included in these figures, however, were terrible results in our California
workers’ compensation operation. There, we have work to do. There, too,
our reserving severely missed the mark. Until we figure out how to get this
business right, we will keep it small.
不过除了这些好消息外，我们在加州退休基金的经营绩效却惨不忍睹，关于那边的
业务我们还有许多工作要做，同时提列准备也严重失真，直到我们确信找到把它们
搞定的方法，否则我们宁愿维持目前较小的规模。
For the fabulous year they had in 2002, we thank Rod Eldred, John Kizer,
Tom Nerney, Don Towle and Don Wurster. They added a lot of value to your
Berkshire investment.

感谢Rod Eldred、John Kizer、Tom Nerney、Don Towle及Don Wurster，让2003
年成为美好的一年，是他们让各位在Berkshire的投资平添许多价值。


Sources of Reported Earnings

帐列盈余的来源

The table that follows shows the main sources of Berkshire’s reported
earnings. You will notice that “Purchase-Accounting Adjustments”
dropped sharply in 2002, the reason being that GAAP rules changed then,
no longer requiring the amortization of goodwill. This change increases
our reported earnings, but has no effect on our economic earnings.

下表显示Berkshire帐列盈余的主要来源，大家或许已经发现，2002年的购买法
会计调整数大幅减少，其原因在于一般公认会计原则已经过修正，不再要求商誉必
须摊销，此举将使得我们的账面盈余增加，只是这对实质的经济盈余一点影响也没
有。

(in millions)

Berkshire’s Share

of Net Earnings

(after taxes and

Pre-Tax Earnings Minority interests)